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We are interested in the macroeconomic implications of the separation of ownership and 
control. An alternative decentralized interpretation of the stochastic growth model is 
proposed, one where shareholders hire a self-interested manager who is in charge of the 
firm’s hiring and investment decisions. Delegation is seen to give rise to a generic conflict of 
interests between shareholders and managers. This conflict fundamentally results from the 
different income base of the two types of agents, once aggregate market clearing conditions 
are taken into account. An optimal contract exists resulting in an observational equivalence 
between the delegated management economy and the standard representative agent business 
cycle model. The optimal contract, however, appears to be miles away from standard 
practice: the manager’s remuneration is tied to the firm’s total income net of investment 
expenses, abstracting totally from wage costs. In order to align the interest of a manager more 
conventionally remunerated on the basis of the firm’s operating results to those of 
stockholder-workers, the manager must be made nearly risk neutral. We show the limited 
power of convex contracts to accomplish this goal and the necessity, if the manager is too 
risk averse (log or higher than log), of considerably downplaying the incentive features of his 
remuneration. The difficulty in reconciling the viewpoints of a manager with powers of 
delegation and of a representative firm owner casts doubt on the descriptive validity of the 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Standard dynamic macroeconomics has avoided issues raised by the separation of 
ownership and control. It implicitly assumes either that there is no such separation or, 
alternatively, that all problems arising from it are totally resolved either by a complete 
monitoring of managers’ decisions or via employment contracts that perfectly align the 
interest of the managers with those of the firm owners. As a result the crucial 
intertemporal decisions (and pricing) are all in accord with the intertemporal marginal 
rate of substitution of the representative shareholder-worker-consumer. 
Yet, recent events clearly indicate less than full respect for the interests of 
shareholders, thus underlining the importance of incentive conflicts resulting from 
delegation as stressed by modern microeconomics. In the micro literature these incentive 
issues can take a variety of forms, e.g., shirking of effort, empire building, and/or the 
pursuit of private benefits. In this paper we observe that, in a macro general equilibrium 
context with delegated management, a generic conflict of interests arises between 
shareholders and managers as a result of the priority payments made to workers in 
modern labor markets; i.e., of what the traditional business literature has termed 
operating leverage
1. In the absence of complete markets where this conflict could be 
resolved (but where all incentive provisions would also be annihilated), it implies that the 
IMRS of managers and of firm owners differ in equilibrium, and that while the former is 
relevant for the determination of the firm’s investment policy, the latter is at the heart of 
asset pricing. If this divergence cannot be eliminated by appropriate contracting or by 
                                                 
1 In Danthine and Donaldson (2002a) we explore another implication of operating leverage taking the 
hypothesis of limited stock market participation by workers as a starting point.  2
outright monitoring, self-interested managers will make intertemporal decisions that will 
not be those favored by shareholders. Imperfect control thus implies that the dynamics at 
the heart of the standard business cycle model based on the representative agent IMRS 
will be invalidated
2.  
In this paper we illustrate this conflict and explore its implications for economic 
dynamics in the context of the one good stochastic growth model. This model was 
originally conceived as a summary of the problem faced by a benevolent macroeconomic 
central planner.  Not until the seminal work of Brock (1982) and Prescott and Mehra 
(1980) did the model become eligible for use as a vehicle for analyzing data from actual 
competitive economies.  These authors provided a decentralization scheme; that is, a 
formulation of the model under which its optimal allocations can be interpreted as the 
market allocations of a competitive economy in recursive equilibrium. 
  The models of Brock (1982) and Prescott and Mehra (1980) share a number of 
essential features: both interpretations postulate infinitely lived consumer-worker-
investors who rent capital and labor to a succession of identical one period firms. It is 
these consumer-worker-investors who undertake the economy’s intertemporal investment 
decision.  Subsequent, more realistic interpretations admit an infinitely lived firm which 
undertakes the investment decision usually under the added assumption either than the 
firm issues and maximizes the value of a complete set of state claims, or that it issues and 
maximizes the value of a single equity share while otherwise being supplied with the 
representative shareholder’s marginal rates of substitution (see Danthine and Donaldson 
(2002b) for an elaboration).  Here, we relax the complete market hypothesis and discuss 
                                                 
2 This criticism also applies to less standard representative agent models such as those in the younger New 
Neo-classical Synthesis tradition.  3
the extent to which the stochastic growth model can be viewed as describing the time 
series properties of a decentralized economy in which firms’ management is delegated to 
“firm managers” who cannot be perfectly monitored by firm owners
3.  
An outline of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 proposes the framework of our 
inquiry and discusses a number of modeling options. Section 3 focuses on the conflict of 
interests arising between firm owners and the manager.  Section 4 shows that an optimal 
contract aligning perfectly the interests of the two agent classes exists but that its main 
feature appears to be wildly at variance with standard contracting practice. Section 5 
looks at the problem when the manager is offered a renewable one-period contract based 
on free cash flow. It details the nature and the implications of the conflict of interest and 
explores the possibilities to resolve it by including real-world-like, possibly non-linear, 
contract features. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2.     The framework and modeling issues 
There is one single firm, acting as a stand-in for a continuum of identical, 
competitive firms, and a continuum of identical agents. A subset of measure  of these 
agents is randomly selected to manage the firm. The rest act as workers and shareholders. 
When our goal is to compare the delegated management economy with the standard 
representative agent business cycle model, we typically assume that the manager’ 
measure is  = 0. The manager is self-interested and, during his (finite) tenure with the 
firm, he is assumed to make all the relevant decisions in view of maximizing his own 
intertemporal utility. Upon termination of his contract, he resumes being a worker-
shareholder. 
                                                 
3  Another extension in the same spirit is provided by Shorish and Spear (1996) who propose an agency 
theoretic extension of the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model.  4
The main motive for delegation is, realistically, to relieve shareholders of the day-
to-day operation of the firm and the information requirements it entails. This means that 
shareholders delegate to the manager the hiring and investment decisions and all that 
goes with them (human resource management, project evaluation, etc..) but that, as a by-
product, they lose the informational base upon which  to evaluate and monitor the 
manager’s performance and to write complete contracts with him. Here we portray 
shareholders as detached firm owners, keeping informed of the main results of the firm’s 
activities but not of the “details” of its operations such as the current level of, and future 
perspectives on, total factor productivity (which is stochastic), its capital stock level, and 
the level of the investment expenses decided by the manager.  
The manager could, in principle, use his informational advantage for several 
purposes.  One particular hypothesis, emphasized in the corporate finance literature, 
asserts that managers are empire builders (Jensen, 1986) who tend to over-invest and 
possibly over-hire rather than return cash to shareholders. Philippon (2003) and Dow, 
Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2003) explore some of the general equilibrium implications 
of this hypothesis in related contexts. By contrast, we purposefully refrain from 
postulating “external” conflicts of interests. We rather concentrate on those conflicts 
arising endogenously as a result of the fact that, by the very nature of delegation, the 
manager’s marginal risk preferences generically differ from those of shareholders or, for 
that matter, those of the representative agent of the standard stochastic growth paradigm. 
While such a conflict of interests could arise from intrinsically different preferences, we 
show that it more fundamentally results from the different income base of both types of 
agents, once aggregate market clearing conditions are taken into account. Contrary to  5
Philippon (2003) and Dow, Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2003), in our setup there is no 
equilibrium distortion in the hiring decision, and the (severe) distortions in the investment 
decision are not manifest in the steady state investment level, as when managers are 
empire builders, but only in its business cycle properties
4.  
Telling a simple and consistent story requires resolving the following three 
modeling issues. First and least importantly, we assume that managers are not paid an 
hourly wage and that consequently the labor-leisure trade-off becomes irrelevant for them 
the day they accept a managerial position. Second is the question of the managers’ tenure.  
We could assume that they have a permanent association (as the manager) with their firm 
but wish to explicitly confront the problems raised by managers’ finite tenure (although 
this turns out not to be the main issue). With finite tenure the question arises of whether 
current management decisions have an impact on the managers’ situation after they have 
left the firm. We believe realism dictates a negative answer. Rather than assuming (fairly 
plausibly) that managers retire or even die after they leave the firm, we model them as 
resuming their career as worker-shareholders. But we assume that they work in a firm 
different from the one they formerly managed, and that they hold diversified portfolios. 
Thus, their previous decisions as managers have no material impact on their situation as 
worker-shareholders after their tenure as managers has come to an end.  
The third and more difficult problem is the issue of the managers’ outside income. 
Outside income influences the marginal attitude toward risk and is relevant in the 
contracting problem between shareholders and managers. This problem itself has two 
components. The first one is the permissible asset trades. Clearly, the spirit of our 
                                                 
4 Yet, free cash flow is a strong predictor of investment in our context as well as in Dow, Gorton and 
Krishnamurthy (2003).  6
analysis is one of incomplete risk exchange opportunities between the manager and the 
shareholders. And it is one where managers cannot use the financial markets to “undo” 
the characteristics of their incentive remuneration. We naturally assume that the manager 
cannot trade stocks. This is realistic in the sense that managers have their income 
disproportionately tied up with the fortunes of the company for which they work, without 
the possibility of taking equi-proportionate positions in the aggregate market. In 
particular, managers typically face restrictions in their ability to take (short) positions in 
the stock of their own firm or to adjust their long positions at specific times. This 
hypothesis also substitutes for the more difficult assumption that the investments of the 
firms are not spanned by existing assets, an assumption that is necessary to open up the 
possibility of disagreement among agents in this economy.  
It is more controversial (although customary in the partial equilibrium contracting 
literature) to assume that the manager is also prevented from taking a position in the risk 
free asset.  The size of the conflict of interests uncovered in this paper, however, implies 
that were risk-free borrowing and lending the only mechanism bringing the IMRS of the 
two agent types closer together, unplausibly large trades (relative to the manager’s 
consumption level) between the manager and shareholders would be necessary. For this 
reason we find it more revealing to detail the potential of simple contracting to resolve 
the conflict without the help of the risk free asset market.  
The second element of outside income is the agent’s financial wealth before he 
becomes a manager. If the representative worker-shareholder becomes a manager, he can 
be viewed as owning his share of the market portfolio. In the spirit of the above 
discussion we assume this diversified portfolio is placed in a blind trust. And it is  7
reasonable to assume that, as a manager of an individual firm, he is not preoccupied with 
the effect of his management decisions on the value of the market portfolio. It 
nevertheless remains that the existence of this outside income source alters the manager’s 
marginal rate of substitution in a way that would at times render some of our derivations 
more opaque without bringing in any specific insight. In these cases we abstract from it.  
We most specifically deal with the quantitative consequences of outside income in 
Section 5.3. 
The worker-shareholders in our economy are potentially differentially risk averse. 
Complete risk sharing possibilities among themselves, however, guarantees the existence 
of a representative individual. Besides choosing their optimal consumption and portfolio 
investment streams, shareholders are in charge of defining the form of the manager’s 
compensation, g
m(.). Managers are offered renewable one-period contracts limiting to the 
maximum the shareholders’ need to collect reliable accounting information on the 
performance of the firm. The probability that the current management contract will not be 
renewed is constant at all times and equal to  (possibly zero).  
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m is his 
effective period discount factor, the product of (1-), his probability of “survival” with 
the firm and of his subjective discount factor
5. E is the expectations operator (we assume 
rational expectations). The manager’s decision variables are it, the amount of the current 
output invested at date t, and 
f
t n , the level of employment. The date t state variable vector 
contains kt, the beginning of period t capital stock and t the current productivity level; t 
follows a Markov process whose characteristics are summarized in the transition function 
F. The expression 
ff 1
ttt t t t f(.) f(k ,n ) k (n )
￿￿ ￿     is the aggregate production function, 
wt , the market determined wage payment, dt , the dividend or free-cash-flow, g
m , the 
contractual payment to the manager; dt is the income from the blind trust in which the 
manager’s initial wealth (his share  of the market portfolio) is invested, and  is the 
constant depreciation rate of physical capital.
6 There is no dividend smoothing in our 
model and the dividend and free cash flow are thus identical; we use the terms 
interchangeably. 
For the manager’s problem to be well defined we have to spell out the link 
between his remuneration and his decisions. Because the manager is self-interested, 
aligning the interests of the manager with those of shareholders require tying his 
remuneration to the operational results of the firm. Furthermore, as we will confirm at a 
                                                 
5  We assume the subjective discount rates for both worker-shareholders and manager are identical. At each 
date t, the manager is making his decisions in view of their impact on current and future utilities. The 
manager’s utility at date t+1 can be written as 
w ms (1 ) v(c ) v (c ,n ) t1 t1 t1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿  where the second term represents 
his utility after resuming being a worker-shareholder. As discussed, we assume that the manager’s decision 
on the levels of the firm’s investment and employment at date t have no bearing on his personal income 
( wn ( 1 ) d t1t1 t1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ and consumption after his tenure. The form of the objective function in (1) follows. 
6 Nothing would change materially if we included a fixed amount of managerial input as an additional 
productive factor with the overall production function being constant returns to scale. This would make 
comparisons with the standard business cycle model more difficult, however. In the present version of the 
model, if the manager is not of measure zero, his remuneration decreases the return to stock holding.  9
later stage, contracts explicitly linking the manager’s remuneration to the level of sales 
(yt) or the level of employment (nt) introduce first-order “empire building” distortions 
relative to the preferences of firm owners. The more natural contract base is the firm’s 
free cash flow, dt.  This variable adequately reflects the operating results of the firm. 
When it is used as a basis for the manager’s remuneration, it results in first-order 
conditions that have the same general form as the FOC’s obtained in the standard 
problem and to steady-state investment and employment levels identical to those of the 
comparable representative agent economy. Note that a contract g
m(dt) includes the 
situation where part of the remuneration of the manager is provided in the form of shares 
of the firm under management, shares that he is not allowed to sell during his tenure, 
however. As already mentioned we restrict ourselves for the moment to one-period 
contracts. In Section 6, we briefly explore the complementary view of making the 
manager’s compensation a function of the pre-dividend value of the firm, (dt + qt ), a 
contract that encompasses the situation where the manager holds a tradable position of 
the stock of the firm he manages. 
 The form of the representative shareholder-worker’s problem is standard 
although we want to be specific as to the content of his/her information set. We do not 
assume shareholder-workers to be aware of the aggregate state variables (kt,t). We rather 
view them as statisticians able to correctly infer the transition probability functions of the 
variables that they take as market or firm determined: wt, qt and dt.
7  The representative 
shareholder-worker problem reads:  
                                                 
7 They can be viewed as the shareholders of a Lucas-tree economy: the firm is a fruit-producing tree. They 
observe the net output after the labor necessary to shake the trees has been paid and the fruits composted 
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. ) is the consumer-worker-investor’s period utility of consumption, H(. )  his 
utility for leisure; 
s
t c  his period t consumption, nt his period t labor supply, zt the fraction 
of the single equity share held by the agent in period t, and G(.) describes the transition 
probabilities for the relevant variables. The period utility function is purposefully 
assumed to be separable in consumption and leisure to permit comparison with a set-up 
where the relevant intertemporal decision is made by an agent whose utility for leisure is 
not specified.  
3.   A generic conflict of interests 
Problem (2) has the following recursive representation 
 t1 t
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whose solution is characterized by the  following  relationships:      
(3) 
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  From (4), the non-explosive equilibrium ex-dividend stock price takes the form: 
                                                 
8  It follows from Blackwell’s (1965) Theorem and the results in Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) that a 
continuous, bounded V
s( ) exists and has a unique solution characterized by (3) and (4) provided u( ) and 
H( ) are increasing, continuously differentiable and concave, and that dG( ) has the property that it is 
continuous and whenever h(d,q,w) is continuous,  h(d’ ,q’ ,w’ )dG(d’ ,q’ ,w’ ;d,q,w)  is continuous as a 
function of (d,q,w).  11
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1t j Gj















G refers to the expectations operator based on the information contained in the 
probability transition function G. From (4) or (5) it is clear that the pricing kernel relevant 
for security pricing is the shareholders’ IMRS.  
Under appropriate conditions, the manager’s problem has recursive 
representation: 
(6) 
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The necessary and sufficient first order conditions to problem (6) can be written 
(7)     
mm f
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where this latter representation is obtained using a standard application of the envelope 
theorem.  
  In equilibrium, at all dates t, 
(9)     
sf
tt t nd n n    , and 
(10)      t z= 1 -  
(11) 
sm s m
tt t t t t t t t t yf ( k , n ) c d cicci   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9  It again follows from Blackwell’s (1965) Theorem and the results in Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) 
that a continuous, bounded V
m( ) exists that solves (6) provided v( ) and f( ) are increasing, continuous and 
bounded, and that g
m( ) is itself continuous and that dF(’;) is continuous with the property that for any 
continuous h(k’,’),  h(k’ , ’ )dF( ’ ; )    is also continuous in k and . In order for (7) and (8) to 
characterize the unique solution, the differentiability of v( ), g
m( ) and f( ) is required and v(g
m( )) must be 
concave.  12
At this stage, it is useful for the discussion to spell out the equations that 
characterize the equilibrium in the standard stochastic growth model where the central 
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and ct , nt, kt, and it have interpretations entirely consistent with problem (1), (2); e.g., ct 
denotes the consumption of the representative agent, it his period t investment, etc. In this 
economy, nt, it are fully characterized by, respectively, 
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The first observation that can be made is a confirmation that, as formulated, the 
agency problem does not introduce any distortion in the employment decision. Indeed, 
from (3), (7) and (11) one obtains, in equilibrium, 
(16) 
m




The similarity between (13) and (16) confirms that, under our hypotheses, the form of 
the leisure-labor trade-off is not affected by the delegation of management. This result 
provides support for a contract based on free cash flow. By contrast, suppose that the  13
remuneration of the manager was based on a combination of dt and yt or nt and denote it 













This does not yield the standard condition that the marginal product of labor should 
equal the going wage. For example, assume a contract based on sales and dividends, 
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The above equation obviously leads to excess-employment (even in the steady 
state) compared to (7): the manager values employment for its contribution to sales over 
and above its impact on the firm’s financial results
10. The same sort of steady state 
“level” distortion is evidently present if the contract is based on employment.  
With the form of the leisure-labor trade-off unaffected by the delegation of 
management, the labor supply decision will be the same in the delegated management 
economy as in the standard model provided that the investment and capital stock levels 
and the level of consumption of the representative worker-shareholder are all the same. 
The assumption that the manager is of measure zero is designed to guarantee that the 
latter condition holds, i.e.,
m
ttt t t yc iyi , t 

 
 "  .  
The same sort of assessment cannot be made for the dynamics of investment.  
Indeed, equation (14) can be written as 
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10  It is straightforward to show that the same sort of problem arises if the contract is based on the wage bill.  14
 
while together with (11) equation (8) yields 
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Again equations (17) and (18) have a similar form and this yields further support to a 
remuneration based on free cash flow. When the remuneration is based on sales, an 
“empire building” distortion similar to the one shown above for the employment decision 
would also be manifest in the manager’s investment decision
11. 
But, while equations (17) and (18) have a similar form, they effectively differ in four 
possible ways. First the utility functions of manager and shareholders may not be the 
same; second, the discount factors may differ, in particular as a result of the manager’s 
finite tenure; third, whenever the manager’s contract is not linear in dt, there is a 
“correction” to the manager’s IMRS; fourth and most interestingly, the arguments in the 
utility functions are different: the representative agent’s consumption is necessarily, as a 
result of market clearing restrictions in a representative agent economy, equal to output 
net of investment. No such constraint applies to the manager’s consumption, which could 
in principle be anything! It is therefore unlikely, except by design of his contract, that the 
manager’s consumption stream (or the representative manager’s for that matter) would 
possess the same time series properties as the representative shareholder’s. This is the 
source of a generic conflict of interests between the agent and the principals. To see the 
                                                 
11 For a contract  xyd ttt ￿￿ ￿￿ , the equivalent to equation (8) becomes  
       
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  15
issue more clearly let us assume for a moment that u( ) and v( ) are identical,  
m = # and 
that the manager’s contract is linear dt. We are then essentially comparing 
1t 1 t 1
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In principle these two IMRS can be very different and lead to highly diverging 
investment decisions. The key consideration is that the manager’s consumption is 
residual from aggregate income after both investment expenses and income payments to 
workers and shareholders. On the contrary, shareholders are first and foremost workers, 
thus entitled to the wage bill. This difference in perspective is not trivial because the 
priority payment to workers is quantitatively so very large.  In Section 5 we detail the 
extent and the implications of this conflict when the manager’s contract is a simple 
function of free cash flow. First we discuss the possibility and the nature of an optimal 
contract between the manager and the firm owners. 
4.   Optimal contracting: sharecropping 
Suppose that the manager has no outside income (he had no asset before starting 
as a manager) and that his contract takes the form 
m
tt t g( y i ) % 
 . This implies that the 
worker-shareholders in the aggregate receive a total remuneration of 
tt (1 )(y i ) 
% 
 entailing compensation both for their labor and for capital ownership
12. 
                                                 
12 Here we assume no outside income for transparency. With outside income dt the manager’s contract 
would be  m g( y i ) d tt t t ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ . One could not really talk of sharecropping.   16
This can be viewed as a sharecropping contract. With this contract, equation (17) takes 
the form:  
  
m 1t 1 t 1
1t 1 t 1t 1 t 1t
1t t
v( ( y i ) )
1 " 	   # 
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which, under standard homogeneity hypothesis for v( ), reduces to  
(19)    
m 1t 1 t 1
1t 1 t 1t 1 t 1 t
1t t
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Equation (19) has exactly the form of equation (17). Before we draw conclusions we 
have to insure that such a sharecropping contract is compatible with labor being allocated 
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Moreover, under this scheme and competitively determined wages, 
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where $ is the capital share in value added. Thus, provided % is sufficiently small relative 
to $# it will be possible to honor the manager’s contract out of capital income in each and 
every state of the world, that is,  t d0 , t . "  Sharecropping then is indeed compatible with 
the working of a competitive labor market. With a capital share of output approximately 
equal to 30% of value added, the pre-condition should, in principle, be satisfied. 
This discussion provides the intuition for the following theorem:  17
Theorem 4.1: Suppose u( ) = v( ), both being increasing, concave and 
continuously differentiable. Assume also that 
m = & Then, a sharecropping contract, 
m
tt t g( y i ) % 
 , for some positive constant%$  , is necessary and sufficient for a Pareto 
optimal allocation of labor and capital.  
 Proof: see appendix 
Theorem 4.1 has the immediate following corollary: 
Theorem 4.2 (Equivalence Theorem). Assume that the conditions of Theorem 4.1 
are satisfied and that in addition the manager is of measure  = 0. Under sharecropping, 
the delegated management economy exhibits the same time series properties as, and is 
thus observationally equivalent to, the representative agent business cycle model.  
This result is important since it extends the realm of application of the standard 
business cycle model. The measure zero assumption is made for convenience only to 
facilitate comparison with the standard representative agent model. With a positive 
measure management one would want to increase the productivity of factors to make up 
for the consumption of the manager in such a way that the consumption level of 
shareholder-workers, and consequently their labor supply decision, remain unchanged in 
equilibrium.  
It is interesting to inquire under what conditions some of the assumptions of 
Theorem 4.1 can be lifted. The following result suggests that it is relatively easy to 
correct for the manager’s short term perspective.  
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 4.1 apply but for the fact 
that 
m (1 )  
   '  . Then a time-increasing sharecropping contract, 
m
tt t t g( y i ) % 
 ,  18








, with ( the degree 
of homogeneity of v1(.), is sufficient for a Pareto optimal allocation of labor and capital
13.  
Proof: Follows immediately from observing that with the proposed contract, the 
FOC (19) becomes  
    
1
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1t 1t 1t 1 t 1t 1
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Extending Theorem 4.1 to different utility functions is not as straightforward. Let 
us start by observing that sharecropping is sufficient for Theorem 4.2 but not exactly 
necessary in the sense that a slightly more general contract, which would not, however, 
yield a Pareto optimal allocation, would also imply the same time series for investment 
and capital. Suppose indeed that both agents have log utility and the contract g
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13 The time-increasing sharecropping contract is sufficient. It may not be necessary: a contract of the type 
%(yt –it) +  it may, under certain circumstances, also achieve the desired correction.   19
implying that an intertemporal optimality equation for investment equivalent to 
equation (19) would obtain and that the manager would choose the same investment 
function as in the stochastic growth model. Yet his compensation function would not lead 
to a Pareto optimal allocation of aggregate consumption.  
This observation suggests a generalization of Theorem 4.2 to the case where the 
utility functions of the manager and the shareholders do not coincide, although they must  
both be of a CES form. We thus have  
Corollary 4.1. Suppose the utility functions of the manager and of shareholders 








 with rate of risk aversion * for the manager, *
s for 
shareholders. Then the delegated management economy replicates the time series of the 
standard business cycle model when the manager’s contract is an extended sharecropping 















Under these assumptions the competitive equilibrium is not, however, Pareto Optimal. 
 Proof: see appendix. 
  In the case of heterogeneous utility functions, it is thus not possible to 
simultaneously align the interests of the manager to those of shareholders, and to provide 
optimal risk sharing. Typically if the manager is more risk averse than shareholders, his 
consumption will be too variable, if he is less risk averse, he will be over-insured. 
  In this section we have thus showed the existence of an optimal contract in the 
case where the utility functions of the manager and of shareholders coincide. We have 
also an observational equivalence result between the delegated management economy  20
and the representative agent business cycle model when the two agent types have 
different but constant relative rates of risk aversion. In both cases we rely on a contract 
whereby the manager’s remuneration is tied to the firm’s total income net of investment 
expenses. 
The basis for these contracts is clear: since the representative shareholder is first 
of all a worker, and in this respect the beneficiary of the wage bill, there is a sense in 
which, from the viewpoint of shareholders, wages should not be considered as a cost to 
the firm’s operations. Ignoring the wage bill thus promotes a better alignment of the 
interests of the agent with those of the principals.  
Yet there is no denying that such a contracting perspective is wildly at variance 
with standard practice: wage costs feature prominently in the appreciation of a firm’s 
performance and are very much a part of incentive-based contracts! This observation 
motivates us to examine the properties of contracts more in accord with practice, i.e., 
based on a more standard appreciation of a firm’s performance. In the simplified set-up 
of our model free cash flows or dividends are the best indicator of the firm’s results and 
are the natural basis on which to write incentive contracts. In the next section we explore 
the nature of the conflict of interests between manager and shareholders when contracts 
are based on free cash flow and discuss the potential of realistic contract forms to resolve 
the corporate governance problems raised by delegated management.  
5.  Contracts based on the firm’s operating results     
We start this section by quantifying the conflict of interests between firm-owners and 
managers when the manager’s contract is an affine function of free cash flow.  Here and 
in subsection 5.2 we abstract from the possibility of the manager receiving outside  21
income. In subsections 5.2 and 5.3 we explore the potential of more sophisticated 
contracts based on dt to approximate the performance of an optimal contract. 
5.1.  Documenting the implications of the conflict of interests 
The fact that the relevant IMRS has free cash flows or dividends as its argument, 
rather than aggregate consumption, may be expected to have an impact on the investment 
decision and consequently on the dynamics of the economy for at least two reasons. First, 
operating leverage, that is, the quantitatively large priority payment to wage earners, 
makes the residual free cash flow a more volatile variable than aggregate consumption. In 
the standard Hansen (1985) RBC model the non-filtered quarterly standard deviation of 
the former is about 14% vs. 3.3% for the latter.  This in turn implies that, ceteris paribus, 
the manager will tend to be excessively prudent in his investment decisions. Second, in 
the same model the free cash flow is a countercyclical variable. This results almost 
mechanically from calibrating properly the relative size of investment expenses, of the 
wage bill, and generating an aggregate investment series that is significantly more 
variable than output
14. But this can be expected to have an important impact on 
investment. Indeed in the standard RBC model, a positive productivity shock has both a 
push and a pull effect on investment. On the one hand, shock persistence implies that the 
return to investment between today and tomorrow is expected to be unusually high. This 
is the pull effect. On the other hand, the high current productivity implies that output and 
consumption are relatively high today. The latter signifies that the cost of a marginal 
consumption sacrifice is small. This is the push effect. While the pull effect is unchanged 
in the delegated management model, the push effect would be absent, or even negative if 
                                                 
14 With dt = yt – wtnt – it = $yt - it and $ = .36, if investment is about 20% of output on average, an 
investment series that is twice as volatile as output will make dt countercyclical.    22
the free cash flow variable were to remain countercyclical. This should make for a much 
weaker reaction of investment to a positive productivity shock. 
Another way to express this is to note that as a rational risk averse individual the 
manager wants to increase his consumption upon learning of a positive productivity 
shock realization since the latter is indicative of an increase in his permanent income. 
But, for the manager, such a consumption increase necessitates an increase in dividends, 
which obtains only if the response of investment to the shock is sufficiently moderate.   
Numerical simulation confirms this intuition and permits detailing some of its main 
implications. Table 1 reports the H-P filtered standard deviations of the main 
macroeconomic aggregates in the delegated management economy and compares them 
with those of the Hansen (1985) indivisible labor model. 
Table 1 : HP-Filtered Standard Deviations of  Main Macro Aggregates – Indivisible 
Labor vs. Delegated Management 
  Hansen indivisible labor  Delegated management economy 
  SD Relative  SD  SD Relative  SD 
y  1.80 1.00 1.01 1.00 
c  .52 .29 .87 .86 
i  5.74 3.19 1.41 1.40 
n 1.37  .76  .14  .14 
k  .49 .27 .12 .12 
Note: same parameters for both economies: u( ) = v( ) = log( ); H(1-nt)= Bnt, B = 2.85; $ 
= .36, =.025,
2
t1 t t t ; .95, N(0; ); .00712 ￿￿ ￿  +   , +  , --    ; g
m(dt)=.1dt ; =0. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 display the Impulse response function of both models
15. The 
mechanics underlying the delegated management model is seen to be profoundly altered. 
The starting point is the much more sober reaction of investment to the productivity 
shock yielding, as expected, a much smoother behavior for the investment series 
(Relative SD(i) is about one third of its value in the reference Hansen (1985) economy). 
                                                 
15 These are the products of computing the dynamic equilibria of the model with the help of the algorithm 
provided by Harald Uhlig (http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wpol/html/toolkit/version4_1.html).  23
The natural consequence of this fact is to make consumption absorb a larger proportion of 
the shock and be more variable (Relative SD(c) is multiplied by almost 3). This in turn 
means that the marginal utility of consumption is very responsive to the exogenous shock 
implying that the reaction of labor supply required to maintain the equality in (16) is 
smaller. That is, the reactivity of employment to the shock is significantly smaller, 
yielding a weaker propagation mechanism and a smoother output: SD(y) falls from 1.8 % 
to 1%, and the standard deviation of the exogenous shock process must be increased by 
about 75% to restore the aggregate volatility of the economy to its observed level. 
This discussion underlines the profoundly different dynamics resulting from (18) as 
opposed to (17) even when u(.) = v(.) and 
m = . It highlights the fact that the key (for 
macrodynamics) investment decision is, in a delegated management economy, in the 
hands of an agent, the manager, whose preferences are inherently very different from 
those of the representative shareholder-worker. Given the peculiar nature of the optimal 
contract, one is left wondering under what circumstances the properties of the investment 
series will indeed be compatible with the IMRS of the representative shareholder. In 
other words, while it is clear that the adjunction of corporate governance considerations 
does not strengthen the descriptive power of the neo-classical stochastic growth model, 
one is left with the suspicion that omitting such considerations lead to a massive 
overstatement of the descriptive performance of the standard RBC paradigm
16. 
                                                 
16 This perspective, however, suggests an increase in corporate governance problems as a possible 
contributing explanation to the decrease in the aggregate volatility of  the US economy.  24
Figure 1: Indivisible labor model IRF’s 
 
Figure 2: Delegated management model IRF’s 
 
  25
5.2  Effects of non linear one-period contracts on free cash flow 
It is quite natural to attempt to correct the timidity of the manager in his 
investment decisions by endowing him with a convex contract. In this subsection we set 
out to verify the validity of this intuition. To this end, we relax the assumption of a linear 
g
m contract and explore the extent to which a non-linear one-period contract can mitigate 
the conflict of interests between firm owners and the manager. We start with contracts of 




tt g( d ) M ( d ) ( d ) ,
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where d is the average free-cash-flow level when  1 . . The constant term is designed to 
insure that the average manager’s remuneration is little affected by changes in the 
curvature of the function; M corresponds to the fraction of free-cash-flows accruing to 
the manager. Our rationale for exploring the implications of such contracts is the 
presence of the first derivative of the remuneration function as the modifier to the IMRS 
of the manager in equation (18). With contract specified as per (20) and a CES utility 










the marginal utility term in the RHS of 
(8) takes the form: 
 
mm 1 1( 1 ) 1
1t 1 t t v (g (d ))g (d ) [M(d) ] (d )
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ .   
and the effective IMRS of the manager becomes:   
(21) 
(1 ) 1 mm
mm 1 t1 1 t1 t1
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Expression (21) provides the basis for the following: 
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 Theorem  5.1. Under contract (20), the manager’s effective risk aversion results 
from a combination of his subjective coefficient of risk aversion and the curvature of the 
contract. It is given by the expression: 1( 1) 
. 
* . 
In practice this result implies that an economy with * = 3 and a linear contract 
(1( 1) 
. 
* =3) is observationally equivalent (except for the volatility of the manager’s 
consumption and its correlation with output) to one where * = 2 and . = 2 or * =4 and . = 
2/3, etc.  
It has the following corollary implications: 
Corollary 5.1.  If the manager has logarithmic utility (* =1), then his investment 
decision cannot be influenced by the curvature of the remuneration contract and the 
results of Section 5.1 apply for all values of .. 
Corollary 5.2.  If the manager is less risk averse than the log ((1 ) 
* > 0), then indeed 
a convex contract .0/010makes the manager’s effective rate of risk aversion smaller than 
his subjective rate of risk aversion, thus leading to a more aggressive investment policy.  
For the FOC on investment to be necessary and sufficient, the effective measure of risk 





Corollary 5.3.  If the manager is more risk averse than the log, (1 ) 
* < 0 , then the 
larger ., the more effectively risk averse the manager becomes.  
In this context if one wants the manager to behave more aggressively, that is, for his 
effective measure of risk aversion to be larger than his subjective rate of risk aversion, 
one would rather propose a concave contract (. < 1)! Note that there is no way to make  27
the manager effectively less risk averse than the log if his * is larger than 1, short of 








Corollary 5.4. If the only source of conflict between the manager and the shareholder 
is heterogeneity in their attitude toward risk, then an appropriately designed (that is, with 
the right curvature .) short term contract of the form (20) can perfectly resolve the 
conflict and insure the desired investment policy will be followed in a delegated 
management environment. This is true, however, only if the manager’s utility function is 
not logarithmic. 
The upshot of these results is that the only plausible case where a short run non-linear 
contract is likely to have the desired effect is the case where the manager is less risk 
averse than the log and he is offered a convex contract. Table 2 displays the results 
obtained for several convex contracts when the manager’s rate of risk aversion is ½. 
 
 Table 2: Delegated Management Economy: *
 = ½ ; convex contracts, various . 
  Standard Deviations in %  Correlation with output 
.   1.5  1.9  1.95  1.96  IL*  1.5  1.9  1.95  1.96  IL* 
y  1.07 1.37 1.65  1.77  1.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
c
m  1.01 7.53  14.02 16.78   -.81 -.89 -.89 -.89  
d  .67 3.96  7.19 8.56   -.81  -.89  -.89  -.89   
c
s  .85 .73 .69  .70  .52 1.00  .94 .76 .65 .87 
i 1.73  3.43  5.09 5.79 5.74  1.00  .98 .97 .96 .99 
k  .15 .28 .38  .42  .49 .32 .43 .48 .50 .35 
n  .23 .73 1.21 1.42 1.37  .97 .94 .93 .93 .98 
w  .85 .73 .69  .70    1.00  .94 .76 .65  
r
k  .037  .047  .06  .06  .06 .99 .98 .97 .97 .96 
* Indivisible Labor economy with log utility 
Other parameter values as in Table 2 
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Table 2 shows that it is possible to get very close to the time series properties of 
the indivisible labor economy, but to obtain that result we have to make the manager 
effectively almost risk neutral. With . = 1.96 and * = ½, the exponent of dividend growth 
in the IMRS is  (1 ) 1 .04 .
 * 
 
 . Note that with these parameter values, the variability 
of manager’s consumption becomes quite extreme
17. Moreover the manager’s 
consumption is then highly countercyclical. Essentially what these results stress once 
again is the importance of operating leverage translating into naturally countercyclical 
free-cash-flows. The incentive dimension of the manager’s contract then has the natural 
property of inducing a countercyclical consumption path. To avoid this undesirable 
characteristic, a risk averse manager is led to moderate the response of investment to a 
favorable productivity shock. The more risk averse, that is the lower the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, the more pronounced is this effect.  On the contrary, if the 
manager is almost risk neutral or if his contract makes him effectively close to risk 
neutral relative to changes in dividends, then he becomes again freer to react to the pull 
effect on investment of a positive productivity shock.  
  These results suggest that the RBC model could be reinterpreted as descriptive of 
the time series of an economy where corporate governance problems are present but have 
been resolved in the manner just described via appropriately designed remuneration 
contracts. The problem with this interpretation, as the present context has made clear, is 
that the right contract has to be extremely precisely fine tuned to the exact degree of risk 
aversion of the manager. Furthermore, a log-utility manager cannot be so manipulated. 
                                                 
17 As an application of Theorem 5.1, let us observe that the same macroeconomic dynamics would be 
obtained in an economy where the manager’s risk aversion is * =2 and the contract curvature is . = -.98. 
The only (important) difference is that with such a contract the manager’s consumption would turn pro-
cyclical: +(y,c
m)=+.89 instead of -.89.  29
Finally Corollary 5.3 suggests that when the manager is too risk averse, that is, too 
unwilling to substitute consumption intertemporally, there is no recourse but to propose 
him with a remuneration that is negatively correlated with the growth of free-cash-flows. 
While this appears counter-intuitive at first sight, it may help rationalize some observed 
practices that are often heavily criticized in the press and the public.  
 5.3  Manager’s contract with a fixed component and outside income. 
The limited power of contract curvature to align the interests of the manager with 
those of shareholders in this context leads us to explore the potential of contracts that 
would more clearly mimic the remuneration characteristics of shareholder-workers. In 
addition we now fully take into account the possibility of the manager deriving outside 
income from his blind trust portfolio.  
In the standard RBC model, shareholder-workers derive the largest fraction of 
their income from wages. Our discussion so far suggests the importance of attempting to 
replicate these proportions in order for the manager to enjoy an income base that 
approximates shareholder-workers’. Because we do not want to propose contracts that 
would inherently introduce new distortions, we refrain from tying up manager’s 
remuneration to the level of wages, to the wage bill or to the level of output (see Section 
3). We rather assume that the proposed remuneration consists of a fixed component and 
an incentive based component, the latter being, as before, a function of free-cash-flow. 
We are interested in particular in testing whether such contracts have a better chance to 
align the interests of the manager with those of shareholders and, if so, what should be 
the relative proportions of the fixed and the variable parts. The answers to these questions 
are provided in Table 3 where we assume a log utility manager of measure   30
approximately equal to 1%. By this we mean that the baseline case will be one where he 
receives about 1% of the steady state wage bill (itself corresponding to 70% of income), 
1% of aggregate dividends as a result of his portfolio holdings, and 1% of the firm’s 
dividends as incentive compensation. The characteristics of the economy are absolutely 
identical when this number is 2% or ½ % instead of 1%, that is, if the three components 
of the manager’s income are increased or decreased simultaneously (while maintaining 
the assumption that he is approximately of measure zero).
18  
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where  is a parameter representing the relative importance of the fixed component and 
y
ss stands for the steady-state GDP level. When  = 1, the fixed and the incentive 
components in the manager’s remuneration are proportional. For reference we report the 
results obtained when the fixed component is absent ( = 0). Then we increase the 
relative size of the fixed component to make it 3% ( = 3) and even 8% ( = 8) of the 
steady state wage bill.  
                                                 
18  One may reasonably argue that managers’ remuneration should be more than proportional to their 
measure in the economy: they are better paid than the average worker; M>. The adopted hypothesis leads 
to maximizing the role of outside income without altering the main point of this subsection. See the next 
footnote, however.  31
Table 3: Delegated Management Economy: * = 1 ; linear contracts; M=1%;  = 1% 
  Standard Deviations in %  Correlation with output 
   0  1  3  8  IL*  0  1  3  8  IL* 
y  1.01 1.07 1.20  1.46  1.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
c
m  .12 .17 .20  .19    .26 -.88  -.89  -.89   
d  .12 .69 2.04 4.98   .26 -.81  -.88  -.89   
c
s  .87 .85 .79  .71  .52 1.00  1.00  .99 .90 .87 
i 1.41  1.74  2.44 3.95 5.74  1.00  1.00  .99 .97 .99 
k  .12 .15 .21  .31  .49 .26 .32 .38 .45 .35 
n  .14 .23 .44  .88  1.37  .99 .97 .95 .93 .98 
w .87  .85  .79  .71    1.00 1.00 .99  .90   
r
k  .03 .04 .04  .05  .06 .99 .99 .98 .98 .96 
* Indivisible Labor economy with log utility; y
ss = 1.12. Other parameter values as in 
Table 2 
 
The first lesson of Table 3 is a confirmation of the role played by the natural 
counter-cyclicity of dividends. Without fixed remuneration the manager decides on 
investment expenses compatible with his consumption being pro-cyclical. This leads to a 
very smooth behavior of investment.  With a fixed component in his remuneration 
(proportional to his importance in this economy, but nevertheless much larger than the 
variable component), the time series properties of dividends and of the manager’s 
consumption are dissociated. When  goes from 0 to 1, the variability of investment 
increases by 23% and dividends move from being positively correlated with output to a 
correlation with output of -.81. Yet this change in the parameter  is largely insufficient 
for the properties of the delegated management economy to approximate those of the 
standard business cycle model. For that to be the case the relative weight of the fixed 
component of the manager’s remuneration must be larger than 8 times the weight of the 
variable “incentive-based” component, which is considerable (this case is provided for 
illustrative purpose only since for this parameter value the hypothesis that the manager’s  32
consumption does not directly impact shareholders because he is approximately of 
measure zero becomes untenable).
19  
We have focused in this paper on the natural conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers arising from market clearing conditions. In so doing we have 
largely bypassed the other sources of conflicts of interests emphasized by the 
microeconomic literature and motivating incentive-based contracts. The results of this 
section suggest that to resolve the conflict of interests arising from macro considerations, 
the incentive component of managers’ remuneration should be toned down considerably. 
There does seem to be a conflict between the incentive compatibility conditions resulting 
from a micro perspective and those arising from a macro perspective.   
In Table 4 we look at alternative parameterizations. First we observe again that if 
the manager is less risk averse than the log (* = ½), it is easier to have him adopt a pro-
cyclical investment policy. This translates into the fact that a linear contract with  = 8 
now assures an almost perfect match with the time series properties of the indivisible 
labor model (the SD(y)=1.78 in this case as opposed to SD(y)=1.46 in the similar case of 
Table 3 where the rate of risk aversion is * =1). If we assume away the manager’s outside 
income, this result is even achieved with a proportionality parameter  = 4 .
20 
Alternatively, with a rate of risk aversion of * = ½ it is possible to combine the effects of 
a convex contract with those of a remuneration with a fixed component. With a fixed 
component ( =2), a small degree of contract curvature (. = 1.052) is sufficient to 
achieve an almost perfect match with the time series of the indivisible labor model. In 
                                                 
19 In the absence of outside income and with a manager of measure 1%, the time series properties for the 
case of  = 8 would be obtained for =4. 
20  The data are identical to those reported in the first column of Table 3.  33
this situation the contract curvature transforms the moderately risk averse manager (* 
=1/2) into an agent with effective risk aversion of 1-.(1-*) = .474 (Theorem 5.1). The 
difference is small but sufficient to lead the manager to alter the properties of his 
investment decisions in a striking fashion. If we abstract away from outside income, the 
same result is even achieved with  =2  and . = 1.019, or with  =1 and . = 1.055. In 
the case of a less-risk-averse-than-log manager, a remuneration combining appropriately 
a fixed component with an incentive element that is a convex function of free cash flow 
thus appears as a powerful way for shareholders to resolve the conflict of interests. It is, 
however, one that requires a delicate calibration around the manager’s exact measure of 
risk aversion. 
 
Table 4: Delegated Management Economy: * = 1/2 ; M=1%;  = 1% except in the case 
marked No Outside Income (NOI) where  =0 - Various  and . 
  Standard Deviations in %  Correlation with output 









y  1.78  1.78 1.79 1.79 1.80  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 
c
m  .34 1.24 .67  1.29   -.89  -.89 -.89  -.89  
d  8.74  8.71 8.83 8.77   -.89  -.89 -.89  -.89  
c
s  .71  .70 .71 .70 .52  .70  .63 .63  .63 .87 
i 5.88  5.86 5.93 5.90 5.74  .96 .96  .96 .96  .99 
k  .42  .42 .42 .42 .49  .49  .50 .50  .50 .35 
n  1.44  1.44 1.46 1.45 1.37  .93 .93  .93 .93  .98 
w  .71  .70 .71 .70  .70  .63 .63  .63  
r
k  .06  .06 .06 .06 .06  .97  .97 .97  .97 .96 
* Indivisible Labor economy with log utility 
Other parameter values as in Table 2 
 
6.   Remunerating the manager on the basis of the firm’s market value 
Here we extend the definition of the one-period contract to the pre-dividend market 
value of the firm. Indeed this may appear as a natural possibility, one that would better  34
align the interest of the manager with those of the shareholders. In effect this contract is 
like offering shares of the firm to the manager (with the restriction that he cannot trade 
them during his tenure as a manager) before also remunerating him with a fraction of the 
firm’s free cash flow. We show presently, under the simplifying assumption that the 
information of shareholders leads them to value the firm as the representative agent of the 
standard model, that such a generalization would lead to an investment decision 
determined by the unweighted sum of the IMRS of the two agent types in our economy.  
If the contract is on the pre-dividend market value of the firm, equation (8) takes the 
form  
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.  
Thus with this contract shareholders make sure that their viewpoint (IMRS) is partially 
represented: in fact the investment decision now reflects the equally weighted sum of 
IMRS of both types of agents in this economy. It is the case, however, that under this 
contract an extra dollar of investment is valued twice in the manager’s remuneration, first 
because it increases to-day’s stock price as the market anticipates higher dividends 
tomorrow, second when this increase in dividend materializes tomorrow. Consequently 
relative to condition (8), FOC (23) leads to a substantial amount of overinvestment even 
in the steady state. Note that the solution to this overinvestment problem is obviously not  35
in a contract that is based only on qt and not on dt, since in that latter case the manager 
would never be willing to payout dividends.  
7. Conclusions 
  In this paper we have shown that in the general equilibrium of an economy where 
shareholders delegate the management of the firm, the key decision maker, the manager, 
inherits an income position that inherently leads him to make very different investment 
decisions than firm owners, or the representative agent of the standard business cycle 
model, would make. The conflict of interests is endogenous, that is, it does not result 
from postulated behavioral properties of the manager; it is generic, that is, it characterizes 
the situation of the “average” manager as a necessary implication of market clearing 
conditions; and, it is severe in the sense that, if it is unmitigated by appropriate 
contracting or monitoring, it results in very different macro dynamics.  
  An optimal contract exists in the case where the utility functions of the manager 
and of shareholders (but not necessarily their discount factors) coincide.  This contract 
results in an observational equivalence between the delegated management economy and 
the standard representative agent business cycle model. Unfortunately, the optimal 
contract appears to be miles away from standard practice: the manager’s remuneration 
should be tied to the firm’s total income net of investment expenses, abstracting from 
wage costs. The intuition for this contract is clear: since the representative shareholder is 
first of all a worker, and in this respect the beneficiary of the wage bill, there is indeed a 
sense in which, from the viewpoint of shareholders, wages should not be considered as a 
cost to the firm’s operations. Ignoring the wage bill thus promotes a better alignment of 
the interests of the agent with those of the principals.  36
  Motivated by the obviously counterfactual properties of the optimal contract, we 
have explored the potential of simple real-world-like incentive schemes to resolve the 
conflict of interests. Our main result is as follows. In order to align the interest of a 
manager remunerated on the basis of the firm’s operating results, which are obviously 
impacted by the wage bill, to those of stockholder-workers, for whom wage payments are 
not a cost, the manager must be highly willing to substitute consumption across time. If 
this is the case, he will be prepared to sacrifice his consumption in good times (accepting 
to delay dividend payments to finance large investment expenses) and he will respond 
sufficiently vigorously to favorable investment opportunities.  
There are two ways to make the manager nearly risk neutral. The first is to offer 
him a non linear contract. Convex contracts are, however, no panacea. This is true first 
because a logarithmic manager is insensitive to the curvature of the contract. Second, a 
less-risk-averse-than-log manager does respond to convex contracts. For the conflict of 
interests to be fully resolved, however, it appears that extreme fine-tuning of the 
curvature of the contract is necessary requiring a very precise knowledge (by the firm 
owners who issue the contract) of his rate of risk aversion (or of his intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution). Third, if he is more risk averse than log, there is no solution but 
to propose an unconventional remuneration that is inversely related to the firm’s results, 
paying high compensation when free cash flows are low and conversely.  
An alternative way to make the manager less risk averse at the margin, if his 
preferences are described by a CRRA utility function, is to propose a remuneration with a 
fixed component in addition to the incentive-based element. This approach appears to 
have a better chance of realigning the interest of all parties in the contract and of  37
reproducing the dynamics of the standard RBC model without delegation. If the manager 
is too risk averse (log or higher than log), the macro-based conflict of interests, however, 
requires a considerable downplaying of the incentive component of the manager’s 
contract, a fact that could prove to be a serious constraint in environments where the 
more traditional external conflicts between agent and principal are at work.  
Reconciling the viewpoints of a manager with powers of delegation and of a 
representative firm owner is thus no trivial task. Yet, short of an optimal contract or of 
perfect monitoring, that is, in situations where corporate governance problems between 
managers and shareholders are not adequately mediated, there is little chance that the 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 5.1: 
;  Suppose that u( ) = v( ) and that the contract is one of pure sharecropping. We 
want to show that the investment and consumption functions are Pareto-optimal. Under 
the sharecropping contract,  
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Equation (24) together with equation (19) implies equation (14) which is the Euler 
equation describing investment in the standard business cycle model. The equilibrium in 
the latter case is known to be Pareto optimal. 
 
=  Suppose the investment function and the consumption allocation define a Pareto 
Optimum. Then,  39
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by the homogeneity property. Since u1( ) is continuous and monotone decreasing, it has 
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and we have sharecropping.   
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Pareto Optimality: It is immediate to observe that unless ) = 1 and * = *
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International Center FAME - Partner Institutions 
 
 
The University of Geneva 
The University of Geneva, originally known as the Academy of Geneva, was founded in 1559 by Jean 
Calvin and Theodore de Beze.  In 1873, The Academy of Geneva became the University of Geneva with the 
creation of a medical school.  The Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences was created in 1915.  The 
university is now composed of seven faculties of science; medicine; arts; law; economic and social sciences; 
psychology; education, and theology.  It also includes a school of translation and interpretation; an institute 
of architecture; seven interdisciplinary centers and six associated institutes. 
 
More than 13’000 students, the majority being foreigners, are enrolled in the various programs from the 
licence to high-level doctorates. A staff of more than 2’500 persons (professors, lecturers and assistants) is 
dedicated to the transmission and advancement of scientific knowledge through teaching as well as 
fundamental and applied research. The University of Geneva has been able to preserve the ancient European 
tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic 
and cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, 
and international spheres. 
 
Lausanne is a comprehensive university composed of seven Schools and Faculties: religious studies; law; 
arts; social and political sciences; business; science and medicine. With its 9’000 students, it is a medium-
sized institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage 
interdisciplinary work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of 
Lake Leman in the Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the 
landscape depicted in Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of 
the School of Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of 
Biochemistry is located in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of 
the League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation 
closely connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its 
international character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the 
approximately 650 students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further 
emphasized by the use of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which 
draws upon the methods of  economics, history, law, and political science - reflects its aim to provide a 
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